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Currency options are interesting for market and central bank economists,
because they contain information, which is independent from that provided
by spot and interest rate markets. Option prices reflect the market per-
ception of uncertainty incidental to the future development of the exchange
rate, and therefore, they could be used for monitoring the current market
sentiment. It is then natural to ask how rational this sentiment is, i.e. how
much about actual future development can be predicted from option pri-
ces.
These issues have been studied for main currency pairs, but our article
is one of the first that addresses them in the Czech koruna context. Indeed,
the OTC (over-the-counter) koruna option market has been developing and
expanding now for several years, and thus data time series are becoming
rich enough for analytical purposes.
In the first section of the article, we briefly describe the structure and his-
tory of the Czech FX option market. We characterise four main categories
of contracts traded on the market and suggest how to interpret the prices
of these structures. In addition, we show how probabilistic distributions im-
plied by option prices may be used for monitoring market sentiment.
Next, we explore the behavior of option prices during three eventful pe-
riods of the history of the Czech koruna between January 1997 and Janu-
ary 2002. First, we observe that at-the-money-forward (ATMF) implied vo-
latility-signalled market worries weeks before the crisis unfolded in May
1997. Moreover, other option contracts – risk reversals – demonstrated even
a greater information lead than ATMF straddles. This finding is consistent
with the results of Campa and Chang (1998), who formally showed that
options warned against the looming crisis much earlier than other markets.
Secondly, we briefly discuss thesharp drop in risk reversal prices that occur-
red during the first months of 1999. It coincided with the outflow of short-
-term capital, which had speculated on the interest rate differential be-
tween the Czech koruna, German mark and dollar instruments. And finally,
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s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 286we analyse the behavior of the option market in the context of forex inter-
ventions of the Czech National Bank. We also point out how shifts in mar-
ket sentiment during this period are reflected in risk neutral distributions
(RND) implied by option prices.
The behavior of option prices before the currency crisis in 1997 is an anec-
dote that supports a hypothesis of the rational market expectations. In the fi-
nal part of our study, we investigate this question more formally and test whe-
ther the ATMF implied volatility of koruna options predicts actual future
volatility of the exchange rate. We found that the koruna option market is
quite efficient in this sense. This result is consistent with results for other
currencies.
1. The Koruna FX Option Market
The Czech koruna option market is relatively young. Its origin dates back
to approximately 1996. It is also comparatively small due to thesize of thelo-
cal economy. Nevertheless, it has already overcome the early stages of its
development, and now it may serve as a source of valuable market infor-
mation.
In the beginning, the market was dominated by a small number of local
banks. Later, the market expanded, and foreign, namely London banks,
took the lead. The market is structured as a typical OTC market where
the bulk of the transactions take place on the interbank market. Banks so-
metimes trade directly with each other, but more often they make deals
via brokers.1
In currency composition and average turnover, the koruna option market
shadows the spot market. While in 1997 both mark and dollar options were
traded in parallel. Since the year 2000, euro options have dominated
the market and dollar options have become marginal. The average daily
turnover may be roughly estimated to be about 80–120mil.EUR2and thety-
pical size of a deal being 10 mil. EUR; yet tickets as large as 100 mil. EUR
are sometimes executed. In terms of notional amounts, which, as Table 1
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1 Approximately fifteen to twenty banks actively trade koruna options, but only about five of
them form the market core. About five broker institutions serve the market as well.
2 Unlike exchange markets the OTC markets are traditionally opaque, and one often has to rely
on more or less precise estimates. The turnover number is a consensual estimate of several mar-
ket participants, and it is also consistent with the indication from the Czech National Bank sur-
vey of foreign exchange market turnover realised through Czech banks.
TABLE 1 Approximate Daily Averages in Billions of USD
Source: BIS (1999); CNB (2003); own estimates
Spot, outright forwards and Options
forex swaps
All currency pairs 1500 87
USD – DM (1998) 250 17
USD – JPY (1998) 260 32
CZK – EUR 0.75 0.09
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options. Having turnover and liquidity lower than may be found for main
currency pairs, the koruna option market shows bigger bid-ask spreads.3 In
addition, a smaller number of contract types and strategies are actively tra-
ded, and contrary to some more developed markets, continuous trading does
not exist.
However, while the koruna option market is smaller than option markets
for the main currencies, it is not small in comparison to the size of the ko-
runa spot market. The ratio of turnovers in options and the cumulation of
spot, forwards and swaps is not too different from other markets. It points
to market satiation and its structural maturity.
1.1 OTC Quoting Conventions
In reality, the price of a European currency option is determined by mar-
ket forces and is mainly affected by the current underlying spot rate, op-
tion’s strike price and maturity, domestic and foreign interest rates, and,
importantly, by the uncertainty of the realization of future spot rates. In
the Black-Scholes model a volatility parameter is introduced to model
the uncertainty. For given spot and strike prices, maturity and interest ra-
tes the Black-Scholes formula is a one to one mapping between the koruna
price of theoption and thevolatility parameter. Theimplied volatility phrase
is sometimes used to emphasize this relationship. The Black-Scholes vola-
tility is thus an alternative way for quoting option prices.
The actual exchange rate does not follow the particular stochastic process
required by the Black-Scholes model. Therefore, not only does the implied
volatility change over time but also at a given moment the implied volati-
lity depends on the strike price and maturity of the option. The dependence
of the volatility on the strike (moneyness) is called a volatility smile and its
dependence on maturity is termed the volatility run.
Furthermore, the OTC market developed a convention of measuring
the moneyness of options by the option’s Black-Scholes delta (hedge ratio)
rather than by the difference between spot and strike price. Delta is a mar-
ginal change in the Black-Scholes price of an option with respect to a change
in the spot rate, e.g. the more a call is in the money, the higher its delta,
even though the relationship is non-linear.
To sum up, volatility and delta is used for option quotes instead of plain
option premiums, spot and strike prices. To a great extent, this market con-
vention enables separation of volatility, which measures underlying uncer-
tainty, from other observable market variables that affect option prices most.
Under this convention the volatility smile is described the by relationship
between implied volatility and delta instead of using strike and option pri-
ces expressed in koruna terms.
Remember that the delta of the call option is always between 0 and e–r.T,
where r is a foreign interest rate and T is the maturity of the option. Further,
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3 While a typical bid-ask spread on the Czech market is about 0.5–1 percentage point in terms
of implied volatility, on the developed markets it might be as low as 0.2 %. Nevertheless, Czech
spreads are lower than in other European emerging markets.
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delta quotes is used. A call option with delta  c is referred to as 100  c, i.e.
a 25-delta call is a call option with  c = 0.25. Similarly, a put option with
delta  p is referred to as –100  p, i.e. a 25-delta put is a put option with 
 p = –0.25. Moreover, since for short maturity options the term e–r.T, which
facilitates transformation between the delta of a put and the delta of a call,
is close to one, a call counterpart to the 25-delta put is often referred to as
a 75-delta call instead of a 100 (e–r.T – 0.25) delta-call.
Another abbreviation is used for an at-the-money-forward (ATMF) call.
It is an option with a strike price equal to the forward rate. Denote the mar-
ket quotes of ATMF volatility as ( atmf,  atmf). Sometimes, people refer to it
as a 50-delta call, i.e.( atmf, 0.5). In fact, it is easy to show that, given a mar-
ket quote of volatility  atmf, the delta of a call option with X =  F is
e–r.TN (  atmf   T), where N(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function
of the standard normal distribution. For example the delta for half a year
ATMF call is about 0.52.
A more detailed technical description of the market quoting conventions
and transformations between variables is provided in (Cincibuch, 2004).
1.2 Traded Contracts and Their Interpretation
Contracts traded on the koruna market might be classified into four main
categories. The first one consists of the ATMF straddle, which is the main
contract of the market and represents about 30 %–40 % of the option turn-
over. Its quoted volatility run (its term structure) ranges from one week to
one year, but a one-month horizon seems to be most representative. A long
ATMF straddle is a combination of long positions in the ATMF call and
ATMF put options. ATMF implied volatility reflects the level of uncertainty
perceived by the market and it relates closely to the variance of the distri-
bution of expected returns. The terminal straddle payoff function as well
as the payoff functions of contracts mentioned below are discussed and il-
lustrated e.g. by Hull (1996).
Plain vanilla call and put options fall into the second most important
group which has accounted for about 20 %–40 % of the option turnover.
Singles are traded as OTM (out-of-the-money) options for various strikes
between approximately 20 to 50 delta. Nevertheless, ATMF and 25-delta
contracts are the most usual.
The third category of contracts is formed by risk reversals, which have
accounted for about 20 % of the total option turnover. A long risk reversal
is also a combination of two OTM (most often 25 delta) options: a long po-
sition in the OTM call and a short position in the OTM put. The risk re-
versal price is quoted as the difference between the volatilities of its two
components.
Risk reversals are also quite interesting from an analytical point of view.
Adecrease in the risk reversal price means that the call option becomes less
expensive than theput option. It might be interpreted in away that themar-
1 ––
2
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runa depreciating) than the likelihood of the euro depreciating significantly
(koruna appreciating).4
Therefore, risk reversals could be seen as an indicator of the asymmetry
of market expectations. As such, risk reversals relate to the skewness5 of
the distribution of expected returns.
This phenomenon, however, might be seen from a different “dynamic” per-
spective, which is shared by many market practitioners (Gemmill, 1996).
Assume that the koruna is expected to become more volatile in the wake of
a remarkable depreciation than after appreciation of a similar magnitude.
Then, an option which would become e.g. at-the-money after the deprecia-
tion scenario would have a higher time value than the option that would be
at-the-money in the appreciation scenario. Consequently, the first option
should have a higher price (implied volatility) than the latter one and
the risk reversal would be positive. 
Indeed, volatility asymmetry between the two scenarios would transform
into the asymmetry of the terminal dis-tribution of returns, and in the risk
neutral world the two interpretations are completely equivalent. Never-
theless, investors’attitudes toward risk might also be distinct under the two
scenarios. In this case, higher time value of the options in the depreciation
scenario would reflect increased risk aversion rather than actually expect-
ed volatility and the “dynamic” approach would seem more appropriate.
The remaining group representing 10 %–20 % of turnover encompasses
strangles and various spreads (butterfly, calendar, currency). Along strangle
contract is a combination of long positions in two options: an OTM call and
OTM put. It is quoted as the average of the volatilities of its components
above ATMF volatility. Strangle contracts reflect how concentrated expec-
tations around the forward are. The higher the strangle value, the higher
likelihood which market attributes to extreme values of returns. Thus,
the value of strangles might be associated with kurtosis6 of the distribution
of returns.
ATMF implied volatilities are often quoted several times a day, but risk
reversal and strangle prices change less frequently. For example, it seems
sufficient to sample risk reversals only once every two days for the koruna
market. However, this lower frequency does not necessarily mean low in-
formational value of the data. Indeed, even for the dollar–yen, which is
the most liquid and most heavily traded currency pair, a 25-delta risk re-
versal often stays constant for several days.
To see why this makes sense, consider the difference in meaning between
ATMF-implied volatility and other prices. While the ATMF implied volati-
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4 It should be emphasised that a change in the risk reversal, holding other things equal, does
not alter the mean of the distribution of expected returns. Thus, a somewhat lower likelihood
of significant koruna depreciation might be offset, for example, by the higher likelihood of mild
depreciation of koruna.
5 Skewness is the third central moment of a probability distribution, normalised by the third
power of its standard deviation.
6 Kurtosis is the fourth central moment of a distribution, normalised by the fourth power of its
standard deviation.
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prices, risk reversals and strangles determine only the shape and curva-
ture of the volatility smile7.
They serve as first and second order adjustments of the Black and Scho-
les model, which would imply a flat volatility smile and run. In this sense,
achange in the risk reversal or strangle amounts to the model change. Acer-
tain analogy might be found between volatility smiles and yield curves.
Changes of the ATMF-implied volatility resemble parallel shifts of some 
yield curve and risk reversal, and strangle changes are similar to the chan-
ges of the yield curve spread and curvature. Indeed, spread and curvature
of yield curves tend to change more slowly than the interest rate level.
1.3 Implied Risk Neutral Distributions: A Tool for Interpreting
Option Prices
It is possible to interpret directly quoted option prices along the lines de-
scribed above; or alternatively, one might want to construct some embracive
characteristic. Risk neutral distributions (RNDs) turn out to be such a sum-
marizing tool, encapsulating all available information contained in market
prices. This comfortable feature of RNDs stems from the theoretical result
that under theassumption of no arbitrage and frictionless markets, theprice
of a traded security can be expressed as an expected discounted security
payoff, where the expectation is taken with respect to an appropriate RND
(Cox – Ross, 1976), (Ross, 1976), (Breeden – Litzenberger, 1978).
More thorough treatment of the implied distributions and their estima-
tion could be found e.g. in (Rubinstein, 1994) or (Bahra, 1997). The latter
summarises issues relating to the usefulness of implied RNDs and their in-
terpretation. And, Clews, Panigirtzoglou and Proudman (2000) describe
methods used at the Bank of England for estimating RNDs, which enter as
a regular input to its Monetary Policy Committee briefings. In Cincibuch
(2004), a classification of estimating methods according their generality is
provided as well as a more detailed literature survey.
In this paper, so called Malz (1997) method for RND estimation is utili-
sed. The method uses the fact that under some restrictions an equivalence
might be established between risk neutral distributions and volatility smi-
les.8 Thus, by means of estimating a proper volatility smile one can reach
risk neutral distribution and vice versa. The Malz method is based on
the quadratic interpolation of the volatility smile. Specifically, implied vo-
latilities for several different strike prices (measured by delta) are calcula-
ted from quotes of straddles, strangles and risk reversals. Further, it is as-
sumed that volatility     is approximately a quadratic function of the call
delta  c, i.e.     =a  c
2 + b c +c+ , where parameters a,b and c are estima-
ted from the observed prices and   represents the random error. Finally,
this volatility smile is transformed into the RND via a method devised by
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978).
291 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 7-8
7 volatility as a function of delta
8 For discussion of this equivalence see e.g. (Cincibuch, 2004).
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is illustrated in the section 2.3, which deals with market reaction to forex
interventions of the CNB.
2. The Czech Koruna in 1997–2002
In this section, we make several brief case studies of the development of
the Czech koruna from the option price point of view. First, in 2.1, we ob-
serve that option price behavior before the currency crisis in 1997 indica-
ted their rational forward-looking nature as they predicted the break of
thecurrency peg. Also, in section 3 we investigate this rationality issue more
formally, where we test whether option prices predict actual future volati-
lity of the koruna exchange rate. Secondly, part 2.2 shows that a significant
change in the level of prices of risk-reversals in the beginning of 1999 marks
a break in the FX market structure and the composition of market partici-
pants. Options, as a quantitative indicator, may help to understand this
change, which had been otherwise known only on the level of rumours. And
third, we investigate how forex interventions have been perceived by option
markets and show how probabilistic distributions implied by option prices
might be used for monitoring market sentiment.
The data set we used consists of time series of mid-rate quotes9 for Czech
koruna–German mark and euro option contracts with one-month maturity.
For ATMF straddles and 25-delta risk reversals, we use the time series from
January 1997, and data for 25-delta strangles have been available from
1998. Whenever we needed spot exchange rates and interest rates, we used
the close of business interbank quotes.
2.1 Options Look Forward: The Currency Crisis in May 1997
One of the most prominent events in the recent history of the Czech ko-
runa was the currency crisis in May 1997. ·mídková et. al (1998) explicate
its roots and gives a detailed description of its course and the reaction of
the central bank.
The current account deficit and other problems of theCzech economy were
highly publicised, and the issue of devaluation was discussed in the media
a long time before the actual crisis occurred. However, as benign develop-
ments of the spot rate, implied volatility and risk reversals suggest (Fi-
gure 1 and 2) the market seemed to be unruffled until spring 1997. Indeed,
in the middle of February, the koruna was close to the appreciation side
margins of its  7.5% band, and the CNB spokesman had to declare that
the central bank was concerned about the strength of the currency.
Figure 1 demonstrates that ATMF implied volatility significantly in-
creased already in April 1997, well before thecrisis actually happened. How-
ever, risk reversals suggest that the market began to worry as early as 
February. The elevated likelihood of large depreciation as it was perceived
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s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 292by market participants was manifested in higher risk reversal prices. Fi-
gure 2 illustrates that risk reversals tended to react before ATMF implied
volatility, and as such, they were an earlier and more sensitive indicator of
potential future problems. One might even argue that since investors ope-
rating on the option market are quite sophisticated and since option con-
tracts enable high leverage, high option prices might have revealed specu-
lators’ positioning before they started attacking the koruna exchange rate
regime.
The forward-looking information contained in options before the crisis
was also studied by Campa and Chang (1998). They constructed arbitrage-
-based tests10 of credibility of the target zone based on the forward rates
and on the option prices, and they showed that the koruna exchange rate
band lost its credibility weeks before the actual devaluation.
In the final part of the article, we econometrically support the notion that
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FIGURE 1 Exchange Rate and Implied Volatility before Crisis in May 1997
FIGURE 2 ATMF Implied Volatility and Risk Reversals before the Crisis in May 1997
10 Their tests consist of constructing bounds for option prices that should not be violated if the
target zone is perfectly credible. Consequently, from violating such a bound one could infer non-
-perfect credibility of the arrangement. It may be proved that option-based tests are more po-
werful than simple forward rate tests.
In particular, they report that a convexity test based on options signalled a credibility loss al-
ready 29 days before the breakdown of the regime. In comparison, the simple Svensson test of
credibility based on the forward rate level indicated a credibility loss only 11 days in advance,

























































































































































s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 293not only do options mirror current market perception, but that this senti-
ment is highly rational and that option prices carry information about fu-
ture volatility of the spot. Therefore, the behavior of option prices during
the pre-crisis period may be viewed as an illustration of this options’ for-
ward-looking nature.
2.2 Options Help to Identify and Understand Structural Breaks:
The Outflow of Hot Capital in 1999
Most observers of the koruna market agree that the relative importance
of reasons for currency trades changed substantially in early 1999. Thewide
interest rate differential was animportant impetus for capital flows through-
out 1998, but afterwards, as Czech inflation and interest rates dropped, it
was replaced by privatization and direct investment flows, and the struc-
ture of market participants changed accordingly. As some traders noted,
this change was also reflected in a structural shift in market behavior: since
the second quarter of 1999, they described the currency market as being re-
lieved in comparison with the previous period. Nevertheless, beyond option
prices there is alack of directly observable indicators that might have shown
this shift.11
For an interpretation of how this structural shift was manifested in
the option market, it is useful first to recall the economic environment in
1998. The Czech koruna was quite strong at that time. According to mar-
ket sources12, it was the world’s third-best-performing currency against
the dollar and mark in 1998. Its strength stemmed from the interest rate
differential, which was about twelve percentage points above the mark in
terms of one-month deposits during the first months of the year. Domestic
interest rates were kept relatively high by the Czech National Bank, which
had adopted direct inflation targeting in January 1998 and set an interval
of about six per cent for the net inflation target for the end of the year.13
During 1998, the Czech economy experienced fast disinflation, which re-
sulted from a combination of subdued domestic and foreign demands, de-
clining world commodity prices and strengthening of the currency.
TheCzech National Bank reacted with aseries of interest rate cuts in these-
cond half of the year.14
In these circumstances, the koruna exchange rate was influenced by con-
flicting forces. From the point of view of the real economy, the strength of
the currency was not justified by the competitiveness of domestic producers
294 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 7-8
11 Also, surveys of the Czech National Bank showed that the turnover of koruna spot, forward
and FX swaps somewhat decreased from the high levels experienced in 1998.
12 Bloomberg
13Although many considered the inflation target to be too ambitious, after several months it be-
came increasingly clear that, not only could the target be hit, but that it would even be un-
dershot.
14 The Czech National Bank’s policy was a source of controversy. Many blamed the conjunction
of monetary and fiscal restriction for causing the recession or making it worse. Others claimed
that the recession was a result of structural problems related to inefficient institutions in the
market economy.
s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 294(e.g. (Cincibuch – Vávra, 2000)), and also interest rate cuts would have nor-
mally led to the currency weakening. However, the rate cuts actually pro-
vided support for the koruna as they led to soaring bond prices along the en-
tire length of the yield curve, and investors were attracted by capital gains.
Such an obviously unstable situation seemed to mirror the learning process
of capital markets during the transition to a low inflation environment.
The longer end of the yield curve had not reflected the expectations of such
fast inflation and the ensuing interest rate decline tended to react only ex-
-post and to move together with the short end. Clearly, interest rate cuts
and the consequential capital gains could not have gone on forever, and it
was only a matter of time before the currency would lose its last support-
ing pillar. Actually, it happened in January and February 1999 when a de-
preciation of almost ten per cent was triggered by the Brazilian currency
crisis, bad trade data and further interest rate cuts.15
The option market correctly reflected this uncertainty. Figure 3 shows
high levels of at-the-money-forward, implied volatility and, in particular, of
risk reversals16 in 1998, and their dramatic decline in early 1999 documents
the structural shift and the end of the hot-capital period.
As it was discussed above in section 1.2, higher positive quotes of risk re-
versals may indicate market worries about the sustainability of a curren-
cy’s strength. However, it seems that high risk reversals were also a by-pro-
duct of hedging short term speculative positions. Indeed, the very presence
of mercurial capital increases the vulnerability of the market. As short-term
investors were being replaced by others with a medium- or long-term in-
vestment horizon, the value of risk reversals went down.
2.3 Options Help to Monitor Market Sentiment
September 1999
Forex interventions naturally provide a good opportunity for observing
changes in market sentiment. Therefore, by way of the example of inter-
ventions pursued by the Czech National Bank, we illustrate how options
might be used for sentiment monitoring.
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s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 295In August and September 1999, a series of reports caused market senti-
ment towards the koruna to be very optimistic. Reports showed that the eco-
nomy was recovering from the recession earlier than had been expected and
that annual inflation rose for the first time in 17 months. This led market
participants to the belief that the central bank would forbear further in-
terest rate cuts. Moreover, the external position of the economy improved:
the current account was in surplus in the second quarter of the year and
the August trade deficit was lower than expected. Most importantly, strong
foreign capital inflow was expected for privatisation, real economy projects,
as well as new issues of government eurobonds. All of these factors toge-
ther with the low level of overall debt were cited in the market as a reason
for further strengthening of the koruna with a minimal downside risk. Fi-
gure 4 shows how the option market reflected these changes. The decrea-
sing price of 25-delta risk reversal contracts during the first two decades of
September indicated that appreciation of thekoruna was not arandom aber-
ration within the usual market volatility, but might have developed in
a strong trend.
The central bank was worried that some parts of the economy might have
had problems with adjusting efficiently to the continued fast pace of ap-
preciation. Moreover, expected substantial inward investment seemed to in-
spire secondary speculation. Therefore, at the end of the month, one of
the members of the central bank’s board tried to talk the koruna down. He
stressed the readiness of the bank to stem undue nominal appreciation
through sterilising17 the inflow of privatisation capital. Moreover, he did not
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FIGURE 4 Exchange Rate and Option Prices in September and October 1999. Risk Reversals
Quotes Quadrupled
15 The eurobond market may serve as an illustration of this development. Investors tended to
redeem koruna eurobonds issued by foreign institutions. In 1999, the outstanding amount of
these instruments decreased by more than 26 %.
16 Risk reversal quotes of approximately 3 %–5 % are quite high in comparison with developed
markets where values less than 2 % are typically observed.
17 The government established a special account with the central bank for privatisation pro-
ceeds in foreign currency. Later and according to the market situation, the central bank would
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s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 296exclude the possibility of further rate cuts. This verbal intervention result-
ed in some increase of risk reversals.
The situation changed further on September the 4th, when the central
bank sold koruna on the market and also cut the official repo rate. In re-
sponse, thekoruna weakened, and theprice of risk reversals increased. Also,
the main contract of the option market, the ATMF straddle, began to rise
already before the intervention as a result of CNB comments. In the wake
of intervention, its implied volatility rose reflecting the uncertainty which
the central bank introduced in the market to stem the view that koruna
was a one-way bet. However, market fears waned, and the skewness soon
fell again in late October. The currency also began to appreciate once again.
Nevertheless, the intervention seemed to have effectively slowed apprecia-
tion, because the exchange rate reached the intervention level only in Ja-
nuary of the following year.
This development is documented also in the behavior of risk neutral dis-
tributions estimated from market option prices graphed in Figure 5 and
characterised in Table 2. The distribution from September the 24th in com-
parison with the distribution from the end of August shows an elevated
upside risk18 and a reduced downside risk, which reflects the market’s opti-
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FIGURE 5 Implied Distributions of Monthly Returns in September 1999
18 Upside (downside) risk is defined here as a risk adjusted probability that the currency will
appreciate (depreciate) 3 % or more.
TABLE 2 Summary Statistics for Implied Distributions of Monthly Returns in September 1999
(in %)
31-Aug-99 24-Sep-99 6-Oct-99
Downside risk (>3 %) 8.38 8.24 12.29
Upside risk (>3 %) 3.37 4.77 7.21
Mean 0.31 0.31 0.27
Mode 0.07 0.25 –0.10
Median 0.14 0.27 0.05
Standard deviation 1.84 1.89 2.40
Skewness 73.99 18.43 57.36
Pearson statistic 9.77 2.32 9.39
Kurtosis 188.37 87.35 98.80
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wer distribution asymmetry measured by its skewness and Pearson statis-
tics19 supports this interpretation. On the contrary, higher variance and
asymmetry observed for distributions estimated after intervention reflec-
ted higher market uncertainty.
Winter 2002
From 1999, yield differentials have played a smaller role, and the effects
connected with longer-term investment flows have become the most im-
portant factor affecting the koruna exchange rate. Foreign direct invest-
ment flows accounted for about 10 % of GDP in 1999 and since then it has
been high. In comparison, the current account deficit was much smaller,
the capital account was negligible, and thus, as the balance of payments
identity stipulates, this inflow had to be offset by induced outflows in other
parts of the financial account or possibly by an increase in the Czech Nati-
onal Bank’s international reserves. In this situation, the abundance of fo-
reign exchange had an impact on the exchange rate and led to relatively
quick appreciation.
In the last quarter of 2001 the rate of appreciation fastened and in De-
cember we observed market turbulences. In one week the exchange rate
strengthened by more than 5 %; likely in reaction to government’s an-
nouncement that the gas distribution industry buyer has been chosen. Mar-
ket participants had not been convinced that the central bank and the go-
vernment were determined enough to stem the appreciation and the market
almost collapsed. Its shallowness is illustrated by the bid/ask spreads on
the spot market of about 15 halers, while otherwise it is about only 2 ha-
lers. In this situation, the option market makers were not able to hedge in
the spot market.
As Figure 6 shows, until December, there was a long downward trend in
volatility, but it was interrupted and volatility spiked from a low of 4.25 %
to more than 8 %. The initial jump reflected mainly the short covering in
the illiquid market, but the volatility did not fall. It kept rising and in July
2002 reached levels of about 12 %. It reflects high level of uncertainty re-
garding the future development of the spot rate in the short/medium term.
The comparison of risk neutral distributions estimated from data as of
December the 11th and one month later, which is documented by Figure 7
and Table 3, illustrates the sentiment change. In January the market at-
tributed about 25% probability to the event that spot appreciates or depre-
ciates more than 3 % in one month, while in December such probability was
about only 5 %.
3. Predictive Power of Implied Volatility
It is believed that option prices carry rational forward-looking informa-
tion. Here, we attempt to test the hypothesis of the rational market more
298 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 7-8
19 Pearson statistics is the difference between the mean and median normalised by standard
deviation.
s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 298formally over a longer time span. We follow authors who estimated how well
implied volatility can predict actual realised volatility for various option
markets including those in main currency pairs.
Two regression specifications were investigated in the literature. The first
specification is a conventional test of market efficiency:
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FIGURE 6 Spot and Option Prices in 2001 and 2002
FIGURE 7 Jump in Uncertainty in December 2001
TABLE 3 Summary Statistics for Implied Distributions of Monthly Returns in Winter 2002 (in %)
11-Dec-01 11-Jan-02
Downside risk (> 3 %) 3.6 13.1




Standard deviation 1.4 2.8
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A
t,k =  0 +  i 
I
t,m (1)
and then the second is an extended “encompassing” one:
 
A
t,k =  0 +  i 
I
t,m +  h 
A
t,–l (2)
In the equations, the letter m denotes the maturity of the option, the sym-
bol   
i
t,m denotes implied volatility observed at date t and referring to
the option with the maturity date t+m. Actual volatility is defined as a stan-
dard deviation20 of the daily exchange rate returns over a given period of
time. Specifically, the symbol  
A






t,k =      ––––    
i=t    (ri –   – rt,k)2 (3)
k – 1
where rt = log(St+1) – log(St) represent daily exchange rate returns and
– rt, k =   i=t
t+k–1
ri their appropriate average. To denote historical volatility,
we use the shortcut  
A
t, –k    
A
t–k, k.
The rationale for regressions, which use Black-Scholes implied volatility
as an explanatory variable even when it is not believed that assumptions
of the Black-Scholes model hold, was given by Heynen, Kemna and Vorst
(1994). They showed that Black-Scholes implied volatility is an accurate fo-
recast of average expected volatility over the remaining life of the option
for various GARCH, EGARCH or mean reverting stochastic processes go-
verning the development of the underlying security.
Implied volatility was found to be a good predictor for actual future vo-
latility for stock indices and main currencies. Although, Canina and Fig-
lewski (1993) estimated equations 1 and 2 for S&P 100 index options21 over
the period 1983–1987 and claimed that implied volatility was a poor fore-
cast of subsequent realised volatility and that implied volatility had less
predictive power than the historical, other works qualified their results. For
example, Christensen and Prabhala (1998), examining S&P 100 index op-
tions for the longer time span of 1983–1995, observed that implied volati-
lity well predicted future realised volatility and that it outperformed past
volatility. Moreover, they found a structural shift that happened around
the market crash in 1987, after which implied volatility seemed to have
more predicting power. This partially explains the inconsistency of their re-
sults with Canina and Figlewski’s (1993) findings. As another source of dif-
ference, Christensen and Prabhala cite their different and safer sampling
1 ––
k
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20 Sometimes volatility is measured as a sample standard deviation, e.g. (Christensen – Prab-
hala, 1998); other authors (Jorion, 1995) use the average of squared returns without adjust-
ment for the mean. However, differences between these definitions should not lead to distinct
qualitative results.
21 Chicago Board Options Exchange OEX options
s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 300procedure as they use non-overlapping monthly sampling, while Canina and
Figlewski used daily data, corrected for their serial correlation.
Jorion (1995) analyzed the forecasting ability of options on currency fu-
tures traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for the German mark, Ja-
panese yen and Swiss franc. He distinguished between the informational
content and thepredictive power of volatility implied by option prices. While
predictive power measures the ability to forecast average volatility over
the period before a contract’s maturity, the informational content is less de-
manding and measures how good the implied volatility is in forecasting one-
-day actual volatility. In our notation, investigating the predictive power
and informational content would mean estimating equations 1 and 2 for 
k=mand k = 1, respectively. As Jorion’s results presented in Table 4 shows,
in both cases and for all three currencies, options contain a significant
amount of information about future volatility and that they have more fo-
recasting power than time series models.
3.1 Sampling Procedure and Estimation Results
We investigated whether Jorion’s results hold also for the exchange rate
of the Czech koruna. Concerning the sampling methodology, we took into
account Christensen and Prabhala’s (1998) warning suggesting that an im-
proper econometric approach towards the overlapping data might lead to
biased estimates. To diminish the possible problems stemming from pos-
sibly correlated data in overlapping samples, we constructed non-overlap-
ping samples and estimated Equations 1 and 2 on these restricted data sets.
Specifically, for a given number of trading days (k) over which actual future
volatility is calculated, we used only a subset of observations that would al-
low the calculation of the actual volatilities from disjoint sets of spot rates.
Formally, if one data point for Equation 1 consists of   
A
j, k,   
j, m then the next
one in a subsample consists of   
A
j+k,k,   
j+k,m. Similarly for regression 2, if
one data point consists of  
A
j, k,   
j, m,  
A
j,–k then the next one in our sample
consists of  
A
j+k,k,   
j+k,m,  
A
j+k,–k. It follows that for a given k, we may obtain
k such non-overlapping subsamples.
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Information content coeficients for Predictive power coeficients for
const. implied historical R 2 const. implied historical R 2
vol. vol. vol. vol.
DM –0.080 0.852a 0.052 0.323a 0.547a,b 0.156
–0.095 0.785a 0.085 0.052 0.401a 0.622a –0.173 0.160
JY –0.006 0.783a 0.036 0.327a 0.496a,b 0.097
–0.076 0.668a 0.210 0.037 0.042a 0.421a 0.474 0.105
SF –0.041 0.854a 0.041 0.392a 0.520a,b 0.145
–0.040 0.858a –0.005 0.041 0.526a 0.609a –0.240 0.149
TABLE 4 Predictive Power of Implied and Historical Volatility for Main Currencies
Source: (Jorion, 1995)
Notes: a significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level
b significantly diferent from unity at the 5 percent level
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least squares regressions for all j   {1,2,..., k}. As we used one-month op-
tions m   1M, estimating the equations for k = 20 was quite close to mea-
suring the predictive power, while for k = 5, we moved closer to Jorion’s in-
formational content. For the sake of brevity, we present only typical
estimation results in Tables 5 and 6.
In general, our results confirm Jorion’s findings also for the Czech ko-
runa, an example of an emerging market currency. The results in Table 5
show that Czech koruna options carry a significant amount of information
and that they predict well the character of currency movements. In all ca-
ses, estimates of the coefficient  i are significantly different from zero and
in virtually all cases the estimates are not significantly different from unity.
It is not surprising that estimated coefficients on implied volatility tend to
be higher for a shorter forecasting horizon k, because option dealers are na-
turally less uncertain in short-term volatility predictions, while for longer
term predictions extrapolations might sometimes be used.
More importantly, when implied volatility is pitted against historical vo-
latility, estimates show that implied volatility is a better instrument for fo-
recasting actual volatility than past volatility. The estimates of the coeffi-
cient  i are only marginally lower than for the previous regression, which
contrasts with estimates of the historical volatility coefficient which are not
significantly different from zero.
4. Conclusions
The Czech koruna option market is structured as a typical OTC market.
While in absolute terms it is much smaller than markets for currency op-
tions on major currency pairs, when measured relatively to the magnitude
of the underlying spot market and the economy, its size is similar to other
developed markets. Three brief case studies lead to the conclusion that
the option market may be a source of a valuable information that helps to
interpret market sentiment. Indeed, contrary to cheap market talk, this in-
formation is based on actual large currency bets and hedges. Finally, by
quantitative means it is illustrated that, similarly to other currencies, ko-
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k  0 t-stat. 5% c.i.  i t-stat. 5% c.i. R 2
5 0.005 0.50 (–0.014; 0.024) 0.907 8.86 (0.71, 1.11) 0.26
10 0.017 1.29 (–0.009; 0.044) 0.862 6.25 (0.59, 1.14) 0.27
20 0.028 1.57 (–0.008; 0.065) 0.813 4.28 (0.43, 1.19) 0.26
TABLE 5 Typical Estimation Results for the Market Efficiency Equation
k:j  0 t-stat. 5% c.i.  i t-stat. 5% c.i.  h t-stat 5% c.i. R 2
5 0.004 0.43 (–0.015; 0.024) 0.808 6.75 (0.57, 1.04) 0.110 1.62 (–0.02, 0.24) 0.27
10 0.023 1.80 (–0.002; 0.049) 0.737 4.08 (0.38, 1.09) 0.047 0.42 (–0.18, 1.27) 0.24
20 0.030 1.60 (–0.007; 0.066) 0.609 2.12 (0.04, 1.36) 0.088 0.42 (–0.33, 0.51) 0.26
TABLE 6 Typical Estimation Results for the Encompassing Equation
s_286_304  10.8.2004  06:22  Stránka 302runa options are more useful in predicting future volatility of the exchange
rate than backward looking time series estimates. It strengthens the view
that markets are efficient and dominated by rational agents.
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An Interpretation of Czech FX Options
Martin CINCIBUCH – Czech National Bank, Prague, and the Centre for Economic Research and Graduate
Education in Prague (martin.cincibuch@cnb.cz)
Pavel BOUC – Československá obchodní banka, Prague (pbouc@csob.cz)
This paper opens with a brief description of the Czech FX options market. Seve-
ral case studies of the Czech koruna option market illustrate how options reflect
market sentiment and structural breaks. Risk-neutral implied distributions are sug-
gested as a monitoring tool. Moreover, clear indications of the rational, forward-
-looking behavior of option prices were identified before the Czech Republic’s 1997
currency crisis, and the results of statistical tests support the “rational market” hy-
pothesis.
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